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PROTECTING THE PROFESSION  
OR THE PUBLIC?  RETHINKING 
UNAUTHORIZED-PRACTICE ENFORCEMENT 
Deborah L. Rhode* & Lucy Buford Ricca** 
INTRODUCTION 
For one of us, interest in the professional monopoly spans almost four 
decades.  As a Yale law student in the mid-1970s, Rhode became enmeshed 
in a controversy over unauthorized practice of law (UPL).  She was an 
intern in a New Haven legal aid office that was overwhelmed with routine 
divorce cases.  The office’s strategy was to accept new cases only one day a 
month, leaving the vast majority of poor people with no lawyer and no 
decent alternative.  For a standard uncontested divorce case, attorneys in 
private practice charged what would now be $2,000 to $3,000 for 
completing three forms and attending a hearing that lasted an average of 
four minutes.1  There were no do-it-yourself kits until the legal aid office 
prepared one.  In response, local bar association officials threatened to file 
charges of unauthorized practice of law.  Under existing precedents, they 
had a good chance of winning.2  “That ended that,” as far as the legal aid 
office was concerned.  But Rhode was outraged and began work on an 
empirical study that challenged the bar’s justifications for banning do-it-
yourself assistance.  She has returned to the subject a number of times 
since, including a 1981 article that surveyed unauthorized-practice 
enforcement procedures across the fifty states.3 
This Article continues that body of work.  It provides the first 
comprehensive overview of enforcement practices since the 1981 article.  
The following analysis explores a contested doctrine through interviews 
with chairs of unauthorized-practice committees or other prosecutors and a 
 
*  Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director of the Center on the Legal 
Profession, Stanford University.  The comments of Laurel Terry and reference assistance of 
Rachel Samberg are gratefully acknowledged. 
**  Executive Director, Center on the Legal Profession, Stanford University. 
 1. Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and 
Pro Se Divorce:  An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 123–29 (1976). 
 2. Id. at 109–11, 167–68. 
 3. Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:  A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981) 
[hereinafter Rhode, Policing]; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 87–91 
(2004); Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective:  Alternative Approaches to 
Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode, 
Professionalism in Prospective]; Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-
lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1990). 
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survey of over 100 reported unauthorized-practice decisions in the last 
decade.  In essence, this Article’s central claim is that unauthorized-practice 
law needs to increase its focus on the public rather than the profession’s 
interest and that judicial decisions and enforcement practices need to adjust 
accordingly. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF UNAUTHORIZED-PRACTICE DOCTRINE 
Since the turn of the twentieth century, state courts have asserted 
inherent, and often exclusive, power to regulate the practice of law.4  That 
authority, rooted in constitutional requirements of separation of powers 
between the judicial, executive, and legislative branches, has enabled courts 
to punish unauthorized practice of law as contempt of court.5  Most 
jurisdictions also have misdemeanor penalties and multiple authorities that 
enforce prohibitions, including state bar committees or counsel, state 
supreme court committees or commissions, state attorneys general, and 
local and county attorneys.6  The bar derives its enforcement authority from 
statutes or from state supreme court rules and decisions.7  Nine jurisdictions 
report that enforcement is inactive or nonexistent.8 
Attempts to provide a principled definition of unauthorized practice have 
been notably unsuccessful.9  The American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct avoid the problem by avoiding 
discussion.  Comment 2 to Rule 5.5 notes, “The definition of the practice of 
law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another.  
Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar 
protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified 
persons.”10  How well, and at what cost, are questions discretely 
overlooked? 
Those issues are also ignored in most state law.  A common feature of 
statutory and common law prohibitions is their broad and ambiguous scope.  
A number of jurisdictions simply prohibit the practice of law by nonlawyers 
without defining it.11  Others take a circular approach:  the practice of law is 
 
 4. Laurel Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession:  A Debate in Need of a Public 
Forum, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 79, 111. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and 
Lawyer Regulation, The Role of the Inherent Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 
1 (1989). 
 5. See Wolfram, supra note 4, at 12. 
 6. Rhode, Policing, supra note 3, at 11–12; see also AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. 
ON CLIENT PROT., SURVEY OF UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEES 1 (2012). 
 7. Rhode, Policing, supra note 3, at 12. 
 8. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., supra note 6. 
 9. For discussion of the difficulty, see Catherine J. Lanctot, Does Legal Zoom Have 
First Amendment Rights?  Some Thoughts About Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 262 (2011). See also discussion 
infra note 107. 
 10. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2013). 
 11. For examples, see Rhode, Policing, supra note 3, at 45 n.135.  For state courts’ 
reluctance to offer a definition, see cases cited in Susan D. Hoppock, Enforcing 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Prohibitions:  The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action 
and its Impact on Effective Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 722 n.35 (2007). 
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what lawyers do.12  Some list conduct that is illustrative, such as legal 
advice, legal representation, and preparation of legal instruments, and then 
conclude with some amorphous catch-all provision, such as “any action 
taken for others in any matter connected with the law.”13  On their face, 
these prohibitions encompass a wide range of common commercial activity.  
Many individuals, including accountants, financial advisors, real estate 
brokers, and insurance agents, could not give intelligent advice without 
reference to legal concerns.  Moreover, the ban on personalized assistance 
stands as a powerful barrier to competent, low-cost providers of legal 
assistance.  So, for example, form-processing services may provide clerical 
help, but may not answer simple questions about where and when papers 
must be filed or correct obvious errors.14  A few state bars and courts have 
even concluded that online document assistance constitutes the 
unauthorized practice of law because the services go beyond clerical 
support.15  Only a few states have licensing systems that enable nonlawyers 
to provide limited assistance in specified fields.  However, some of these 
systems explicitly exclude legal advice.16  The breadth and ambiguity of 
this body of law permits considerable discretion in enforcement, and until 
the survey described below, there had been no recent comprehensive effort 
to understand how unauthorized-practice doctrine works in practice. 
II.  SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
During the summer of 2013, we surveyed the chairs or staff counsel of 
state unauthorized-practice committees and other heads of entities 
responsible for UPL enforcement to gain a better sense of enforcement 
policies.  Initially, we emailed a survey to all of those identified by the 
 
 12. See Rhode, Policing, supra note 3, at 45 n.136. 
 13. Id. at 46 nn.140–42; see also Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Bailey, 852 N.E.2d 1180, 
1185–86 (Ohio 2006) (“The practice of law [includes] the preparation of legal instruments of 
all kinds, and in general all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters 
connected with the law.”). 
 14. See Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978); Fifteenth Judicial Dist. 
Unified Bar Ass’n v. Glasgow, No. M1996-00020-COA-R3-CV., 1999 WL 1128847 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1999). 
 15. See, e.g., In re Reynoso, 477 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2007); Unauthorized Practice of 
Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Janson v. 
LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 2011); see also Pa. Bar Ass’n 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., Formal Op. 2010-01 (2010); Conn. Bar Ass’n 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., Informal Op. 2008-01 (2008).  As noted by the Fifth 
Circuit in Parsons Technology, Inc., the Northern District of Texas ruling that online 
assistance was unauthorized practice was overturned by a legislative exemption. See Parsons 
Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d at 956.  The Missouri case was subsequently settled without banning 
the services altogether.  For other discussion, see Lanctot, supra note 9; Tom McNichol, Is 
LegalZoom’s Gain Your Loss?, CAL. LAW., Sep. 2010, at 20. 
 16. For a description of the California, Arizona, and Washington systems that prevent 
advice, see Rigertas, supra note 4, at 114–15, 117–18.  For a proposed expansion of the 
Washington system that would allow limited license legal technicians and for proposals in 
California and New York, see Don J. DeBenedictis, Licensing of Nonlawyers Gets Traction, 
S.F. DAILY J. (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.law.uci.edu/news/in-the-news/2013/djournal_
nonlawyers_052313.pdf. 
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American Bar Association’s Center for Professional Responsibility as 
responsible for the state’s enforcement efforts and supplemented that list as 
necessary.  We followed up with at least two telephone contacts.  We were 
successful in reaching representatives from forty-two states and the District 
of Columbia, twenty-nine more jurisdictions than responded to the ABA’s 
2012 survey on unauthorized practice.17  In a few cases, where enforcement 
was lodged in local district attorneys or the state attorney general’s office, 
we attempted to contact someone in those offices, as well as a 
representative of the state bar.  In total, we have responses from forty-seven 
entities.  Respondents provided estimates where possible in jurisdictions 
that did not collect the statistical information we requested.18  Although the 
majority of enforcement of unauthorized practice of law takes place beyond 
the formal judicial process, it is necessary to explore the doctrinal 
approaches taken by the courts to ascertain a complete picture of the current 
situation.  We reviewed 103 federal and state cases from the past ten years 
in which unauthorized practice was either the primary or a significant issue 
before the court.19   
III.  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY 
We first asked for the total number of complaints of unauthorized 
practice of law the UPL enforcement committees received per year.  Table 
1 reflects those responses. 
TABLE 1:  NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED PER YEAR 
RESPONSE ITEM FREQUENCY PERCENT 
0 to 10 8 22% 
11 to 20 4 11% 
21 to 50 14 38% 
51 to 100 5 14% 
Greater than 100 6 16% 
Total 37  
   
 
 17. Twenty-nine jurisdictions responded to the survey conducted in 2012 by the 
Standing Committee on Client Protection of the ABA. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON 
CLIENT PROT., supra note 6. 
 18. Due to rounding, some statistical totals do not add up to 100 percent. 
 19. See infra note 71.  Because we felt the initial search to be somewhat incomplete and 
to ensure that we captured the important cases from the jurisdictions most affected by 
unauthorized practice, we ran additional searches in New York, Texas, California, and 
Florida and incorporated the leading cases from the past ten years into the review. 
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Responses ranged from “a handful” to 520 a year.20  Just over one-fifth 
of jurisdictions (22 percent) reported minimal enforcement activity:  ten or 
fewer complaints annually.  A majority of jurisdictions reported between 
eleven and twenty (11 percent) or twenty-one to fifty (38 percent), and 
another 14 percent reported between fifty-one and 100.  Sixteen percent 
reported over 100 complaints per year.  As Table 2 indicates, the vast 
majority of these complaints concerned nonlawyers rather than disbarred or 
out-of-state attorneys.  This may, in part, reflect our focus on entities that 
had jurisdiction over nonlawyers; we did not target disciplinary systems 
that in many states would have jurisdiction over lawyers.  Almost two-
thirds of states (61 percent) reported that at least three-quarters of their 
complaints involved nonlawyers, and another quarter (25 percent) of 
jurisdictions reported that one-half to three-quarters of their complaints 
involved nonlawyers. 
TABLE 2:  PERCENTAGE OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT NONLAWYERS 
COMPLAINTS 
ABOUT 
NONLAWYERS 
FREQUENCY PERCENT 
0% to 25% 2 6% 
26% to 50% 3 8% 
51% to 75% 9 25% 
76% to 100% 22 61% 
Total 36  
 
The next question asked the origin of the complaints.  As Table 3 
indicates, about three-quarters (74 percent) reported that less than half of 
their complaints came from consumers or clients.  Most of the remainder 
came from attorneys, as Table 4 indicates, and a small number came from 
other sources, such as judges, consumer protection agencies, immigration 
officials, the attorney general’s office, the bar, or independent 
investigations.  Forty-two percent of jurisdictions reported that at least half 
of complainants were attorneys. 
   
 
 20. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Tuttle, Deputy Head of Antitrust Div., 
Consumer Prot. Div. L.A. Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office (July 22, 2013) (ten a week); 
Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Van Goor, Special Servs. Counsel, State of Alaska 
(June 27, 2013) (a handful). 
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TABLE 3:  PERCENTAGE OF COMPLAINTS  
COMING FROM CLIENTS/CONSUMERS 
COMPLAINTS FROM 
CLIENTS/CONSUMERS 
FREQUENCY PERCENT 
0% to 25% 9 29% 
26% to 50% 14 45% 
51% to 75% 3 10% 
76% to 100% 5 16% 
Total 31  
 
TABLE 4:  PERCENTAGE OF COMPLAINTS COMING FROM LAWYERS 
COMPLAINTS FROM 
LAWYERS 
FREQUENCY PERCENT 
0% to 25% 6 19% 
26% to 50% 12 39% 
51% to 75% 7 23% 
76% to 100% 6 19% 
Total 31  
 
Slightly over one-third of jurisdictions will undertake investigations 
without complaints (38 percent).  One-third of those jurisdictions reported 
investigations in over ten cases per year.  When asked what other agencies 
enforce UPL prohibitions, slightly over half (52 percent) identified the 
attorney general’s office, and slightly over one-third (35 percent) identified 
local prosecutors. 
We then asked respondents how often they filed a case or complaint 
based on unauthorized practice of law and how those cases were resolved.  
About one-third (36 percent) filed five or fewer cases per year and another 
7 percent filed six to twenty.  About one-third (36 percent) filed twenty-one 
to fifty and one-fifth (21 percent) filed over fifty.  Close to half (45 percent) 
of respondents reported that most, or almost all, of their cases were 
informally settled, typically through a warning or cease-and-desist letter, 
and another large percentage reported a high settlement rate without giving 
specific percentages. 
Table 5 reflects the percentage of cases that result in court proceedings.  
The vast majority of respondents (88 percent) reported five or fewer court 
proceedings per year.  Only 3 percent reported more than twenty. 
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TABLE 5:  NUMBER OF CASES THAT RESULTED 
IN FORMAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 
CASES RESULTING IN 
COURT 
PROCEEDINGS 
FREQUENCY PERCENT 
0 to 10 28 88% 
11 to 20 2 6% 
21 to 50 1 3% 
51 to 100 1 3% 
Greater than 100 0 0% 
Total 32  
 
Three-quarters of respondents felt that their enforcement efforts were 
successful in halting unauthorized practice in at least three-quarters of 
cases.  Only 15 percent felt that fewer than one-quarter of cases were 
halted. 
We then asked, “How serious do you think the problem of unauthorized 
practice is in your jurisdiction?”  Respondents split almost evenly between 
those who said it was a serious problem and those who said it was not.  In 
total, 22 percent said it was isolated and rare and 33 percent said it was 
common but not serious, while 30 percent said it was serious and prevalent 
and 14 percent said it was very serious and very prevalent.  In explaining 
their answers, some officials credited efforts by their office in reducing the 
threat.21  Others attributed a substantial problem to large numbers of 
immigrants who “get taken advantage of on a continuing basis.”22  Debt 
adjustment and mortgage foreclosure services also seemed to present 
significant problems.23 
We also asked if unauthorized practice posed a threat to lawyers or to the 
public.  Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of respondents viewed 
unauthorized practice as a threat to both.  Over four-fifths (84 percent) saw 
it as a threat to the public and over three-quarters (78 percent) saw it as a 
threat to lawyers.  In gauging seriousness, some respondents took the 
position that any unlicensed practice posed a threat.  As the deputy counsel 
to the North Carolina State Bar put it, 
 
 21. Telephone Interview with Jim Coyle, Colo. Regulation Counsel (June 24, 2013); 
Telephone Interview with Chuck Plattsmeir, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, La. State Bar (Aug. 
1, 2013). 
 22. Telephone Interview with Jeff McGrath, Deputy District Attorney, L.A. Cnty. 
District Attorney’s Office (July 2, 2013); accord Telephone Interview with Jack Carey, Past 
Chair of Ill. State Bar Ass’n Unauthorized Practice of Law Taskforce (July 8, 2013); 
Telephone Interview with David R. Johnson, Deputy Counsel, N.C. State Bar (June 11, 
2013). 
 23. Telephone Interview with David R. Johnson, supra note 22; Telephone Interview 
with Angie Ordway, Staff Attorney, Ind. Supreme Court Disciplinary Comm’n (July 30, 
2013). 
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Asking if there are any “legitimate” providers who are not licensed begs 
the question.  By definition they are not legitimate as long as what they 
provide is illegal.  In North Carolina, the legislature has declared the 
providing of legal advice and services by one who is not licensed to be a 
criminal offense, not the State Bar.24 
When asked if there should be a role for licensed nonlawyers, he 
responded, “It is not really within our role of an agency to talk about.  We 
are not really in the policymaking business.”25  By contrast, the director of 
Minnesota’s Office of Professional Responsibility offered his personal 
opinion that 
paralegal services that offer assistance to the public with simple legal 
tasks/forms and who perform those services well do not harm the public 
and are likely appreciated by the public; [the] same [is true] for online 
services that offer DIY type services to the public.  Some are of 
reasonably high quality while others may not be . . . .  The problem 
therefore seems to me not to be with “unauthorized practice” by 
nonlawyers per se . . . but that it is not regulated as to the practitioners’ 
competence or ethics.  Licensing and regulating such activities would be a 
major undertaking.  To date, prohibiting the activity, even for those who 
do provide quality work, has been the simpler alternative.  This has led to 
rather uneven enforcement.26 
So too, the chief disciplinary counsel to the Missouri Bar acknowledged 
difficulty assessing the seriousness of the problem because “I don’t know 
how often it goes wrong. . . .  [I] don’t know how often it goes right.  I’ve 
seen some pleadings by nonlawyers that are just as good as lawyers.  Those 
could get prosecuted too.”27  Similarly, the general counsel to the State Bar 
of New Mexico pointed out that “we only hear about [unauthorized 
practice] when it goes really bad.  I know there is a movement to open 
certain practice areas to paralegals and I can see a role for that.”28  New 
Hampshire’s chief of the consumer protection and antitrust bureau did not 
know of “any cases where there has been harm [from unauthorized 
practice].  I do know of cases where it has been helpful.  If you don’t have a 
track record of significant harm being done, it’s difficult to make the 
argument that it is a threat to the public.  And the public can pay a lot less—
[unauthorized practice] could be beneficial.”29  Special counsel to the New 
York State Bar also distinguished between cases posing threats in areas 
 
 24. Telephone Interview with David R. Johnson, supra note 22. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Email from Marty Cole, Dir., Office of Lawyers’ Prof’l Responsibility, Minn., to 
Deborah L. Rhode, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch. (July 2, 2013, 6:53 AM) (on file 
with Fordham Law Review). 
 27. Telephone Interview with Nancy Ripperger, Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, 
Mo. Supreme Court (July 22, 2013). 
 28. Telephone Interview with Richard Spinello, Gen. Counsel, State Bar of N.M. (July 
1, 2013). 
 29. Telephone Interview with Jim Boffetti, Chief Counsel, N.H. Consumer Prot. & 
Antitrust Bureau (June 28, 2013). 
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such as immigration and cases that did not, such as real estate closings.30  
The ethics counsel to Virginia’s state bar also acknowledged that, “when it 
comes to routine document preparation, the bar has not been able to prove 
that nonlawyers are causing any harm.”31  Nonetheless, the Virginia State 
Bar has taken the position that nonlawyer companies like LegalZoom are 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, because they provide 
“substantial assistance to a pro se applicant in selecting and completing 
documents.”32 
As to whether unauthorized practice threatens the legal profession, a 
minority of respondents felt that the threat was “nominal,” either because 
the clients of nonlawyers would not hire lawyers or because lawyers were 
necessary to fix the problems created by unlicensed providers.33  Other 
respondents believed that lawyers perceived a harm and were motivated to 
report nonlawyers whom they saw advertising, because they viewed such 
individuals as “taking work away from them.”34  However, the general 
counsel of the Utah State Bar also added that “regardless of the 
complainant’s motivation, the practice is still unauthorized.  We don’t 
require a victim to investigate advertising.  But it’s not as high on the 
priority list either.”35  By contrast, other respondents emphasized that the 
bar’s concern was “the harm that [unauthorized practice poses to the 
public.”36  An investigator in the Oklahoma Bar’s Office of General 
Counsel noted that “we try our best to concentrate on cases where there was 
harm done to the public.”37 
Although the vast majority of respondents perceived UPL as a public 
threat, over two-thirds (69 percent) could not recall an instance of serious 
injury in the past year.  Of those who reported injury, almost all singled out 
immigration fraud.  In the typical case, an undocumented immigrant paid 
substantial sums and “got nothing done.”38 
 
 30. Telephone Interview with Richard Rifkin, Special Counsel, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n 
(June 28, 2013). 
 31. Telephone Interview with Jim McCauley, Ethics Counsel, Va. State Bar (July 16, 
2013). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Telephone Interview with Chuck Plattsmeir, supra note 21; accord Telephone 
Interview with Jim Coyle, supra note 21; Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Van Goor, 
supra note 20; Email from Marty Cole, supra note 26. 
 34. Email from Katherine Fox, Gen. Counsel, Utah State Bar, to Deborah L. Rhode, 
Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch. (June 20, 2013, 4:00 PM) (on file with Fordham Law 
Review); accord Telephone Interview with Joan Eliel, Investigator, Mont. Dep’t of 
Consumer Prot. (June 25, 2013). 
 35. Email from Katherine Fox, supra note 34. 
 36. Memorandum from Dane Dauphine, Assistant Chief Trial Counsel, Office of Chief 
Trial Counsel, State Bar of Cal., to Deborah L. Rhode, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch. 
(July 1, 2013) (on file with Fordham Law Review); see also Telephone Interview with 
Leland de la Garza, Chair, Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. of the Supreme Court of 
Tex. (July 18, 2013). 
 37. Telephone Interview with Tanner Condley, Investigator, Office of the Gen. Counsel 
of the Okla. Bar Ass’n (July 1, 2013). 
 38. Telephone Interview with Sheila Shanks, Counsel, Neb. Comm’n of Unauthorized 
Practice of Law (July 1, 2013); accord Telephone Interview with Jim Coyle, supra note 21; 
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We also asked about public attitudes toward unauthorized practice.  The 
consensus was that consumers were unaware of the problem unless they 
were personally affected by it.39  A Colorado Bar counsel noted, “Nobody 
wants to see someone taken in a scam, but the public doesn’t want lawyers 
out there policing their own turf.”40  Many respondents reported skepticism 
of their efforts.  A bar staff counsel in Indiana thought that “a lot of the 
public has the perception that lawyers are trying to financially benefit off 
their hardship and a UPL-type company helps them more than a lawyer 
could or would and would be less expensive.”41  The executive director of 
the Maryland State Bar similarly believed that the “public has a negative 
opinion about lawyers because of the fees. . . .  The perception is that the 
lawyers want to protect their own turf.”42  Nebraska’s counsel for the 
Unauthorized Practice Commission noted, “Some people are cynical 
towards lawyers . . . .  They think the bar is concerned about 
competition.”43  The ethics counsel to the Virginia State Bar also believed 
that “unless the bar can demonstrate substantial public harm,” the public, as 
represented by nonlawyer legislators, may feel that lawyers are “engaging 
in anticompetitive practices,” and that it should be “up to the consumer to 
make the choice” about whether to engage a nonlawyer.44 
A number of respondents mentioned the public’s desire for a “lower cost 
alternative” to lawyers and the popular perception that UPL enforcement 
procedures were part of the problem by “protecting lawyers rather than the 
public.”45  The deputy in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office noted, 
People are in a quandary about how to get legal help.  There is a justice 
gap and various parts of the public that need help [find that] . . . the legal 
profession is unreachable for them.  They get tempted to go to some 
businesses like We the People that may or may not be operating legally.46 
Counsel to the Alaska Bar similarly felt that “people are tolerant out of 
necessity.”47  Whether the lack of a “strong public outcry to crack down” 
on UPL affected enforcement strategies is unclear.48  Some respondents 
 
Telephone Interview with Lori Holcomb, Dir., Client Prot., Fla. State Bar (July 3, 2013); 
Telephone Interview with Shannon Presby, Assistant Head Deputy of Justice Sys. Integrity, 
L.A. Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office (June 28, 2013). 
 39. Telephone Interview with Joan Eliel, supra note 34; Telephone Interview with Jeff 
McGrath, supra note 22; Telephone Interview with Carol A. Wright, Investigator to the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., Ala. State Bar (June 27, 2013). 
 40. Telephone Interview with Jim Coyle, supra note 21. 
 41. Telephone Interview with Angie Ordway, supra note 23. 
 42. Telephone Interview with Paul Carlin, Exec. Dir., Md. State Bar Ass’n, Inc. (July 2, 
2013). 
 43. Telephone Interview with Sheila Shanks, supra note 38. 
 44. Telephone Interview with Jim McCauley, supra note 31. 
 45. Telephone Interview with Al Gill, Bar Counsel Investigator, Idaho State Bar (July 
31, 2013). 
 46. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Tuttle, supra note 20. 
 47. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Van Goor, supra note 20. 
 48. Telephone Interview with Joseph Molina, Dir. of Gov’t and Legal Affairs, Kan. 
State Bar (June 27, 2013). 
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seemed to think that the appropriate response to popular perceptions was 
not to shift enforcement priorities but rather to inform the public of the risks 
of unauthorized practice.49 
A final question asked respondents whether any other strategies would be 
more effective.  Unsurprisingly, the most common response was the need 
for more resources.50  Counsel to the Missouri Office of Chief Disciplinary 
Counsel noted wistfully that Florida’s unauthorized practice budget was 
larger than the budget for their entire office.51  More funding would enable 
Kentucky to take a “more proactive approach to preventing unauthorized 
practice of law.”52  Another frequent response was that greater clarity was 
necessary in the definition of unauthorized practice.53  In Mississippi, after 
study by a UPL task force, the bar intends to file a petition with the state 
supreme court to clarify what is and what is not unauthorized practice.54  
Although Arkansas also lacked a definition of unauthorized practice, the 
staff attorney to the state’s unauthorized practice committee did not think 
that was a problem, because it gave the committee “leeway” in 
interpretation.55 
Many respondents were frustrated by the inadequacy of penalties.  Bar 
officials whose only option was civil injunctive remedies often felt that they 
were not enough of a “dissuader.”56  These respondents advocated more 
enforcement by state attorney generals who could impose civil fines and 
freeze assets, or by local prosecutors who could impose criminal 
penalties.57  By contrast, in New York, where enforcement authority rests 
 
 49. Telephone Interview with David Clark, Bar Counsel, Nev. State Bar (July 16, 2013) 
(noting the bar’s “failure” to get the word out about unauthorized practice of law); 
Telephone Interview with Leland de la Garza, supra note 36 (“It would be nice if we could 
have some public information programs”). 
 50. See Telephone Interview with Jack Carey, supra note 22; Email from Katherine Fox, 
supra note 34; Email from Mark H. Hayes, Chair, Unlawful Practice Comm. of the W. Va. 
State Bar, to Deborah L. Rhode, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch. (July 23, 2013) (on 
file with Fordham Law Review); Telephone Interview with Jessica Myers, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Tenn. Attorney Gen. Office (Aug. 6, 2013). 
 51. Telephone Interview with Nancy Ripperger, supra note 27. 
 52. Email from Steven D. Pulliam, Deputy Bar Counsel, Ky. State Bar Ass’n, to 
Deborah L. Rhode, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch. (June 13, 2013) (on file with 
Fordham Law Review). 
 53. See Telephone Interview with Leland de la Garza, supra note 36; Telephone 
Interview with Joseph Molina, supra note 48; Telephone Interview with Christopher Young, 
Deputy Attorney Gen., Haw. Dep’t of the Attorney Gen. (June 27, 2013). 
 54. Email from Adam B. Kilgore, Gen. Counsel, Miss. Bar, to Deborah L. Rhode, 
Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch. (June 28, 2013) (on file with Fordham Law Review). 
 55. Telephone Interview with Charlene Fleetwood, Staff Attorney, Ark. Unauthorized 
Practice Comm. (Aug. 2, 2013). 
 56. Telephone Interview with Leland de la Garza, supra note 36. 
 57. Email from Patricia Bartley Schwartz, Disciplinary Counsel, Del. State Bar Ass’n, to 
Deborah L. Rhode, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch. (Aug. 14, 2013) (on file with 
Fordham Law Review) (criminal or civil fraud enforcement); Telephone Interview with 
Leland de la Garza, supra note 36 (attorney general); Telephone Interview with Al Gill, 
supra note 45 (treatment as a violation of consumer protection laws); Telephone Interview 
with Angie Ordway, supra note 23; accord Telephone Interview with David Feiss, Dir., 
Public Integrity Unit, Milwaukee Cnty. Dist. Attorney (July 31, 2013). 
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exclusively with district attorneys and the state attorney general, counsel to 
the bar felt that this was “not a very effective strategy . . . .  [U]nless there 
has been real harm, they have to prioritize their own caseloads and this is 
never going to be a high priority.”58  To encourage more prosecutions, the 
state had recently made unauthorized practice a felony, and it was too soon 
to tell whether this would lead to greater enforcement.  Louisiana’s chief 
disciplinary counsel also felt that criminal prosecution was “not very 
helpful.  As a practical matter, prosecutors have limited budget and staff 
and have more serious matters to pursue. . . .  It would be far better to have 
the bar devote resources to civil injunctive relief.”59  In Hawaii, the deputy 
attorney general thought it was a problem to have a misdemeanor statute 
that only required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.60  Bar officials from 
Missouri and West Virginia also mentioned the need for stiffer criminal 
penalties.61  Washington’s general counsel to the Practice of Law Board felt 
that the “split responsibility in most states for UPL enforcement leads to 
ineffective control.”62 
Only two respondents mentioned the possibility of other approaches that 
might reduce the need for unauthorized practice.  Nevada recently created a 
licensing scheme for document preparers, who have to be registered and 
bonded in order to complete certain forms.63  In New York, the state’s chief 
judge appointed a panel to explore whether to license nonlawyers to 
perform certain tasks, primarily to assist pro se litigants.64  Another 
respondent, however, thought that the answer to the access problem was to 
get more “good lawyers willing to take middle income problems.”65 
Taken together, these findings suggest a number of broader points about 
unauthorized-practice enforcement.  First, public harm is playing an 
increasing role.  In 1979, only 39 percent of bar chairs reported direct 
customer complaints, and only 21 percent indicated that the complaints 
involved any specific injury.66  Overall, of some 1,188 investigations, 
inquiries, and complaints reported by bar chairmen, only 2 percent arose 
from “customer complaints and involved specific injury.”67  In the current 
survey, 71 percent of respondents reported that at least a quarter of cases 
arose from customers and another 26 percent reported that over half did.68 
Yet consumer harm was not the only factor shaping enforcement 
priorities.  It is striking that over two-thirds of respondents could not recall 
 
 58. Telephone Interview with Richard Rifkin, supra note 30. 
 59. Telephone Interview with Chuck Plattsmeir, supra note 21. 
 60. Telephone Interview with Christopher Young, supra note 53. 
 61. Telephone Interview with Nancy Ripperger, supra note 27; see also Email from 
Mark H. Hayes, supra note 50. 
 62. Telephone Interview with Julie Shankland, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Wash. Adm’r of 
Practice of Law Bd. (July 25, 2013). 
 63. Telephone Interview with David Clark, supra note 49. 
 64. Telephone Interview with Richard Rifkin, supra note 30. 
 65. Telephone Interview with Kathleen Tuttle, supra note 20. 
 66. Rhode, Policing, supra note 3, at 33. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See supra Tables 3–4. 
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an instance of serious public harm in the preceding year.69  Given that over 
three-quarters of respondents (78 percent) thought that unauthorized 
practice constituted a threat to lawyers, and that 42 percent reported that 
over half their complaints came from lawyers, it is likely that bar self-
interest continues to influence enforcement practices.70  Because the vast 
majority of cases are settled informally, there is little opportunity for 
judicial oversight. 
So too, as a number of respondents acknowledged, the public is 
suspicious of the bar’s motives in banning unauthorized practice.  Lodging 
enforcement authority in more publicly accountable officials, such as state 
prosecutors or district attorneys, might allay such skepticism as well as 
ensure that enforcement is based on public harm rather than professional 
self-interest.  In jurisdictions with a substantial amount of client complaints 
and a significant immigrant population, that approach would require 
sufficient resources to ensure adequate enforcement and public education. 
To add to our understanding of unauthorized-practice enforcement, we 
also reviewed the last ten years of reported cases that yielded 103 decisions 
involving nonlawyers.71  We began by categorizing them by subject matter.  
The results are set out in Table 6 below.72 
TABLE 6:  SUBJECT MATTER OF CASE 
SUBJECT MATTER FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
General Civil Litigation 17 17% 
Trusts and Estates 15 15% 
Family Law 14 14% 
Housing or Mortgage 13 13% 
Arbitration or Administrative 
Hearing/Process 
10 10% 
Real Estate 9 9% 
Bankruptcy 9 9% 
Debt Collection 9 9% 
Criminal 8 8% 
Immigration 3 3% 
Other 9 9% 
Total Number of Cases 103  
 
 69. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 70. See discussion supra Part III. 
 71. We ran the following Westlaw search: “adv:  unauth! /10 practice /10 law /10 (non-
lawyer OR nonlawyer).”  It returned 253 cases.  We excluded the following types of cases:  
cases dealing with an attorney assisting a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law, 
cases dealing with an attorney not licensed in the state, cases dealing with suspended or 
disbarred attorneys, and cases dealing with legal support or paralegals employed by 
attorneys.  On review of the remaining cases, we were concerned that the search was 
underinclusive, and supplemented it by conducting targeted searches in jurisdictions in 
which unauthorized practice is a significant problem. 
 72. Where the facts of the case cover multiple areas, our coding reflects both areas. 
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General civil litigation accounted for 17 percent of the cases reviewed.  
This type of unauthorized practice often occurred when an individual filed a 
civil claim on behalf of someone else—either a family member or friend.73  
It also occurred when an officer of a corporation attempted to represent the 
corporation in litigation.74  This category included cases against internet 
document services such as We the People and LegalZoom.75  Finally, 
several cases involved businesses or individual nonlawyers who held 
themselves out as lawyers and advised clients or filed claims.76 
Trusts and estates, which accounted for 15 percent of cases, typically 
involved nonlawyers who drafted trusts and estate plans for others or 
attempted to represent the estate in court.77  In family law, which 
represented 14 percent of the cases, nonlawyers were generally advising 
clients and preparing forms in connection with divorce and custody 
matters.78  Housing, which accounted for another 13 percent of the cases, 
involved both landlord-tenant disputes and mortgages.  Common situations 
concerned banks that completed mortgage forms or nonlawyers who 
assisted homeowners facing foreclosure by setting up a savings plan and 
negotiating with the lender.79 
 
 73. Chase v. City of Earle, No. 3:09CV00167, 2010 WL 1658610 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 21, 
2010); Crump-Donahue v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, No. 4:07CV00511-WRW, 2007 WL 
1702567, at *1 (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2007); Yulin Li ex rel. Lee v. Rizzio, 801 N.W.2d 351, 
352 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). 
 74. See, e.g., Carey v. Indian Rock Corp., 863 A.2d 289 (Me. 2005); Rabb Int’l, Inc. v. 
SHL Thai Food Serv., LLC, 346 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App. 2011). 
 75. See Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1054 (W.D. Mo. 2011); 
Ohio Bar Ass’n v. Martin, 886 N.E.2d 827, 829 (Ohio 2008) (“We the People”).  One 
additional case involving “We the People” arose specifically in the bankruptcy context and 
was only included in that section. See In re Moore, 290 B.R. 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2003). 
 76. See, e.g., Spicuzza v. Liss Fin. Servs., No. C06-1244JLR, 2006 WL 3064947 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 26, 2006); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Brooks, 325 S.W.3d 283, 286 (Ky. 2010); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Pratt, 939 N.E.2d 170, 171 (Ohio 2010); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. 
Joelson, 872 N.E.2d 1207, 1207–08 (Ohio 2007); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. McKissic, 832 
N.E.2d 49, 50 (Ohio 2005). 
 77. For nonlawyers who drafted deeds and estate plans, see Ind. State Bar Ass’n v. 
United Fin. Sys. Corp., 926 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ind. 2010); Ind. State Bar Ass’n v. Northouse, 848 
N.E.2d 668, 670 (Ind. 2006); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Am. Family Prepaid Legal Corp., 916 
N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ohio 2009); Dayton Bar Ass’n v. Addison, 837 N.E.2d 367, 368 (Ohio 
2005).  For nonlawyers who attempted to represent the estate, see Morgan v. Nat’l Bank of 
Kan. City, No. 4:09CV00792-WRW, 2009 WL 3592543 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2009); Hansen 
v. Hansen, 114 Cal. App. 4th 618 (Ct. App. 2003); Brown v. Coe, 616 S.E.2d 705, 708 (S.C. 
2005). 
 78. Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Tarpinian, 337 S.W.3d 627, 629 (Ky. 2011); In re Broussard, 900 
So.2d 814, 814 (La. 2005); Comm’n on the Unauthorized Practice of Law v. O’Neil, 147 
P.3d 200, 204 (Mont. 2006); State v. Yah, 796 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Neb. 2011); Cleveland 
Metro Bar Ass’n v. Boyd, 901 N.E.2d 795, 796 (Ohio 2009); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Boyd, 
859 N.E.2d 930, 930 (Ohio 2006); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Washington, 836 N.E.2d 1212, 
1212 (Ohio 2005). 
 79. For mortgage forms, see Hargis v. Access Capital Funding, LLC, 674 F.3d 783 (8th 
Cir. 2012); King v. First Capital Fin. Servs. Corp., 828 N.E.2d 1155 (Ill. 2005); Charter One 
Mortg. Corp. v. Condra, 865 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. 2007); Dressel v. Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 
151 (Mich. 2003); Fuchs v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 838 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2007).  
For foreclosure, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Foreclosure Alts., Inc., 940 N.E.2d 971 (Ohio 
2010); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Foreclosure Solutions, L.L.C., 914 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio 2009). 
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Arbitration and administrative proceedings, representing 10 percent of 
the sample, involved situations such as a union business agent representing 
the union at a labor arbitration meeting (not UPL), a contractor’s president 
representing the contractor in an arbitration (UPL), and a nonlawyer 
advising clients in connection with suspension of a driver’s license (UPL).80 
Real estate, which represented 9 percent of cases, typically involved 
residential closings and related actions, such as title searches.  What 
nonlawyers can do without constituting an unauthorized real estate law 
practice varies by jurisdiction, and the lines drawn by some courts seem 
arbitrary at best.  In Real Estate Bar Ass’n v. National Real Estate 
Information Services,81 the real estate bar in Massachusetts sued a 
multistate real estate settlement services provider.  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that some of the activities in question, 
such as the preparation of deeds, constituted unauthorized practice of law, 
while others, such as preparation of settlement forms, did not.82 
Bankruptcy cases, at 9 percent of the total, typically involved a 
nonlawyer attempting to represent a friend or family member in bankruptcy 
proceedings, a business offering document assistance, or a bankruptcy 
petition preparer who overstepped the boundaries established by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 110.83  Debt collection, also 9 percent of the sample, often arose in the 
context of a person or business engaged in purchasing and attempting to 
enforce liens or other debts.84 
Criminal cases made up 8 percent of the sample.  In United States v. 
Johnson,85 the Seventh Circuit found that a paralegal firm offering various 
criminal defense services was engaging in unauthorized practice because it 
operated without attorney supervision.  Another scenario involved a 
“jailhouse lawyer” who assisted inmates with legal research, gave advice, 
and helped prepare pleadings.86  Only 3 percent of the cases involved 
immigration, a surprising result given that such matters accounted for the 
 
 80. Nisha, LLC v. Tribuilt Constr. Grp., LLC, 388 S.W.3d 444 (Ark. 2012) (contractor 
president representing contractor in arbitration); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Bailey, 852 N.E.2d 
1180 (Ohio 2006) (nonlawyer giving advice regarding suspension of driver’s license); In re 
Town of Little Compton, 37 A.3d 85, 95 (R.I. 2012) (union agent representing union at labor 
arbitration). 
 81. 946 N.E.2d 665 (Mass. 2011). 
 82. Id. at 676–80. 
 83. See, e.g., In re O’Connor, No. 08-16434, 2009 WL 1616105 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 
27, 2009) (stating that debtor’s daughter could not represent her mother in a bankruptcy 
proceeding); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Brooks, 325 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Ky. 2010) (business offering 
document assistance).  Bankruptcy is likely a larger unauthorized practice issue than 
indicated by this review because of the effect of the federal statute authorizing and setting 
the parameters for bankruptcy petition preparers (BPPs). See 11 U.S.C. § 110 (2012).  Cases 
may discuss the activities of the BPP in the context of a violation of § 110 as opposed to that 
of unauthorized practice of law. See In re Bernales, 345 B.R. 206, 217–18 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2006). 
 84. See, e.g., Roberts v. LaConey, 650 S.E.2d 474 (S.C. 2007); see also Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n v. Lienguard, Inc., 934 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio 2010). 
 85. 327 F.3d 554, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 86. Disciplinary Counsel v. Cotton, 873 N.E.2d 1240, 1241 (Ohio 2007). 
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vast majority of consumer harm reported by our interview respondents.87  It 
could be that prosecution of these cases, when it occurs, happens under  
fraud and theft statutes rather than UPL statutes.88  It could also be that 
even in this high-problem area, prosecution is rare and the bulk of cases are 
resolved informally. 
We next looked at the form the unauthorized practice took.  These results 
are set out in Table 7 below: 
TABLE 7:  FORMS OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE 
FORM OF 
UNAUTHORIZED 
PRACTICE 
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Filing papers in 
court/administrative 
body 
40 39% 
Legal document 
assistance/completion
31 30% 
Giving advice 19 18% 
Holding self out as 
lawyer 
10 10% 
In court appearance 10 10% 
Agency/arbitration 
appearance 
10 10% 
Real estate work 
(closings, title 
searches) 
7 7% 
Other 4 4% 
Total cases 103  
 
The greatest percentage (39 percent) of cases involved filing papers 
(complaints, pleadings, motions, settlements, etc.) in a court or an 
administrative body.  Another 30 percent of cases involved assistance with 
legal documents.  In some instances, individuals believed that they were 
allowed to file and litigate a claim themselves.89  In other cases, lay 
document preparers stepped over the line by completing or filing forms, 
 
 87. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 88. We ran searches for “notario public” and fraud but few cases were returned. 
 89. See Ex parte Williams, 89 So. 3d 135 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (finding that an 
executive director of the housing authority could not file unlawful detainer action on behalf 
of the authority); Forman v. State Dep’t of Children and Families, 956 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a daughter’s power of attorney did not permit her to file claim 
appealing denial of her mother’s Medicaid benefits). Contra In re O’Connor, 2009 WL 
1616105, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2009) (finding that a daughter’s power of 
attorney permitted her to file for bankruptcy on behalf of her mother). 
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such as those connected with bankruptcies or wills and trusts.90  Several 
cases involved banks that charged a separate fee for the completion of 
mortgage documents.91 
The next most common form of unauthorized practice involved 
nonlawyers who gave legal advice (18 percent).  In reality, such advice 
probably occurred in many of the cases involving other prohibited 
activities.  For the purposes of this review, however, we included in this 
category only cases where the court specifically noted that the unauthorized 
practice involved the giving of advice.92 
Other forms of unauthorized practice included holding oneself out as a 
lawyer (10 percent), appearing in court (10 percent), appearing before an 
agency or at an arbitration (10 percent), or assisting with a real estate 
closing (7 percent).93  The 3 percent of cases categorized as “other” most 
often involved nonlawyers who negotiated matters such as debts or 
insurance claims.94 
We also tracked how the case came before the court.  In the majority of 
cases (55 percent) the issue of unauthorized practice arose within the 
context of a civil or criminal matter and not because the bar or another 
enforcement body brought an enforcement action.95  In 43 percent of the 
cases, the complainant was a state or local bar, an unauthorized practice 
commission, or the civil division of the attorney general’s office.96  Only 2 
percent were criminal cases.  These involved a repeat offender and an 
individual who held herself out as an immigration attorney.97 
Our most important inquiry involved whether the court justified its 
holding in light of the injury involved.  In just over half of the cases (56 
percent) did the court even mention protection of the public welfare.  
Typically the court makes sweeping assertions about the potential for 
injury, often unaccompanied by actual evidence.  For example, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the admission rules existed to “protect 
litigants from those persons not legally competent to counsel, advise, and 
 
 90. See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Boyd, 901 N.E.2d 795, 796–97 (Ohio 2009); 
Stark Cnty. Bar Ass’n. v. Bennafield, 836 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ohio 2005) (confronting a 
nonattorney who prepared and filed a complaint and supporting memorandum). 
 91. See supra note 79. 
 92. See, e.g., Ind. State Bar Ass’n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 440 (Ind. 2005); Collins v. 
Godchaux, 86 So. 3d 831, 835 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 93. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 94. See In re UPL Advisory Op., 623 S.E.2d 464 (Ga. 2005) (addressing whether an 
individual or entity who negotiates with a creditor on behalf of a debtor engages in 
unauthorized practice); La. State Bar Ass’n v. Carr & Assocs., Inc., 15 So. 3d 158 (La. Ct. 
App. 2009) (encountering a public insurance adjuster negotiating with insurance companies 
on behalf of clients). 
 95. See, e.g., Tighe v. Mora (In re Nieves), 290 B.R. 370 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) 
(bankruptcy action); Matrix Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Frazer, 714 S.E.2d 532 (S.C. 2011) 
(foreclosure action). 
 96. See, e.g., Molano v. State, 262 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (involving a state 
that sued the defendant for unauthorized practice and violations of the state deceptive trade 
practices statute). 
 97. Rodriguez v. State, 336 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Janda, 298 P.3d 
751 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
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advocate on matters of law.”98  In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Carr & 
Associates,99 the Louisiana Court of Appeal noted that both the 
unauthorized practice statutes and the state bar’s purpose in bringing the 
instant lawsuit were grounded in the need to protect the public.  Neither 
case involved any evidence of injury.  In the survey as a whole, in only a 
quarter of cases (25 percent) did the court analyze whether actual harm 
occurred or could occur from the unauthorized practice in question.  When 
a court did consider whether the unauthorized practice at issue actually 
caused harm to the public, it was often in the context of assessing a penalty.  
Thus, in Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Joelson,100 the bar did not seek, and the court 
did not impose, any fines because the defendant had cooperated with the 
investigation, and there was no evidence he had caused any harm. 
In even fewer cases—11 percent—did the court consider whether the 
unauthorized practice at issue met a public need.  For example, in Cleveland 
Bar Ass’n v. Compmanagement, Inc.,101 in which the bar association sued 
based on Compmanagement’s representation of workers’ compensation 
claims, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that 
there are multiple interests to consider in determining whether a particular 
legal activity is acceptably performed by nonlawyers.  In this way, we can 
freely assume that all representative conduct at the administrative level 
falls within the broad definition of the practice of law, yet still authorize 
lay representatives to perform certain functions in the administrative 
setting when the public interest so demands.102 
Recognizing that lay representation in this context did not require 
“special skill,” the court observed that it also expedited the claims process 
and made it less expensive.103  In Dressel v. Ameribank,104 the court 
rejected the notion that a law license was necessary to draft “ordinary” 
leases, mortgages, and deeds.105  The court stated, “To insist that only a 
lawyer can draft such documents would impede numerous commercial 
transactions without protecting the public, [and] would not further the 
purpose of restricting the practice of law to trained and licensed 
attorneys.”106  This is the kind of analysis that all courts should be 
undertaking. 
 
 98. Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Tarpinian, 337 S.W.3d 627, 630 (Ky. 2011) (adopting the Special 
Commissioner’s report). 
 99. La. State Bar Ass’n v. Carr & Assocs., Inc., 15 So. 3d 158, 167 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 100. Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Joelson, 872 N.E.2d 1207 (Ohio 2007).  The Ohio Supreme 
Court has stated that evidence of actual harm is not necessary to consider in unauthorized 
practice cases because the purpose of the restriction is to prevent harm. See also Cincinatti 
Bar Ass’n v. Bailey, 852 N.E.2d. 1180 (Ohio 2006). 
 101. 818 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 2004). 
 102. Id. at 1194. 
 103. Id. at 1193–94 (quoting Goodman v. Beall, 200 N.E. 470, 471 (Ohio 1936)). 
 104. 664 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Mich. 2003). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (citation omitted). 
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IV.  PROBLEMS IN ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURES 
The findings of this study, together with other research in the field, 
suggest fundamental problems in enforcement structures.  The first involves 
the lack of a coherent definition of unauthorized practice of law.  As the 
American Law Institute put it, “Definitions and tests employed by courts to 
delineate unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers have been vague or 
conclusory.”107 
A second problem is the diffusion of enforcement authority and the 
corresponding lack of accountability for results.  In most jurisdictions, 
responsibility for enforcing UPL prohibitions rests in multiple entities, 
including bar committees and counsel, state supreme court committees and 
commissions, state attorneys general, and local and county attorneys.108  
This split of authority, together with resource constraints, has made it easier 
for some entities to abdicate oversight.  Because the bar’s remedial powers 
are often limited to civil injunctions, the reluctance of prosecutorial officials 
to make UPL a priority has led to significant gaps in enforcement.  
Moreover, many states’ reliance on enforcement by the organized bar, 
rather than by prosecutors or attorneys general, places decisionmaking in 
the hands of officials who lack public accountability and may be influenced 
by anticompetitive interests. 
A third problem is the lack of focus on the public interest. Although bar 
leaders and case doctrine insist that broad prohibitions on unauthorized 
practice serve the public, support for that claim is notable for its absence.109  
Outside a few contexts such as immigration, foreclosures, and trusts and 
estates, it is rare for customers to assert injury, or for suits to be filed by 
consumer-protection agencies.110  As noted earlier, three-quarters of 
jurisdictions reported that fewer than half of their complaints came from 
consumers or clients, and two-thirds of respondents could not recall a 
specific case of injury in the last year.111  Of those who did identify a case, 
almost all involved immigration.112  So too, the vast majority of UPL 
lawsuits filed against cyber-lawyer products are brought by lawyers or 
unauthorized-practice committees and generally settle without examples of 
harm.113  According to a registration statement filed in anticipation of going 
public, LegalZoom has served more than 2 million customers since its 
founding in 2002, and nine of ten of its surveyed customers reported that 
 
 107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (2000). 
 108. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., supra note 6; Hoppock, supra 
note 11, at 720–21; discussion supra notes 5–9. 
 109. For representative bar claims, see Nicholas J. Wallwork, UPL Harms Public, 
Lawyers and Consumer Confidence, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Feb. 2002, at 6; see also discussion supra 
notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 110. Rigertas, supra note 4, at 124.  Evidence of harm from internet legal provision of 
assistance is sparse. Mathew Rotenberg, Stifled Justice:  The Unauthorized Practice of Law 
and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 725 (2012). 
 111. See supra Tables 3–4; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 113. Rotenberg, supra note 110, at 722. 
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they would recommend LegalZoom to their friends and family.114  Our 
review of reported cases also finds little evidence of actual inquiry; fewer 
than a quarter of surveyed cases mentioned evidence of such public 
harm.115 
Other research also casts doubt on the frequency of client injury outside 
the context of immigration.  In other nations that permit nonlawyers to 
provide legal advice and to assist with routine documents, the research 
available does not suggest that their performance has been inadequate.116  
In a study comparing outcomes for low-income clients in the United 
Kingdom on a variety of matters such as welfare benefits, housing, and 
employment, nonlawyers generally outperformed lawyers in terms of 
concrete results and client satisfaction.117  After reviewing their own and 
other empirical studies, the authors concluded that “it is specialization, not 
professional status, which appears to be the best predictor of quality.”118  In 
Ontario, which allows licensed paralegals to represent individuals in minor 
court cases and administrative tribunal proceedings, a five-year review 
reported “solid levels of [public] satisfaction with the services received.”119  
In the United States, studies of lay specialists who provide legal 
representation in bankruptcy and administrative agency hearings find that 
they generally perform as well or better than attorneys.120  Extensive formal 
training is less critical than daily experience for effective advocacy.121 
   
 
 114. LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (May 10, 2012), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286139/000104746912005763/a2209299zs-
1.htm.  In the Missouri case finding LegalZoom engaged in unauthorized practice, the 
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V.  DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 
In a letter to the New York Times, then ABA President William Robinson 
summarized the bar’s opposition to nonlawyer providers: 
The American Bar Association strongly agrees that our nation must 
expand access to justice for low-income Americans.  However, a rush to 
open the practice of law to unschooled unregulated nonlawyers is not the 
solution.  This would cause grave harm to clients.  Even matters that 
appear simple, such as uncontested divorces, involve myriad legal rights 
and responsibilities.  If the case is not handled by a professional with 
appropriate legal training, a person can suffer serious long-term 
consequences affecting loved ones or financial security . . . .122 
Yet opening the practice to “unschooled unregulated nonlawyers” is not the 
only alternative to lawyers’ monopoly over routine assistance.  We 
advocate access to qualified licensed providers.  And that would surely be 
preferable to the current system, where, in contexts such as domestic 
relations or family law, the majority of cases involve at least one party who 
lacks representation by a trained professional.123  Almost all of the 
scholarly experts and commissions that have studied the issue have 
recommended increased access to licensed nonlawyer legal service 
providers.124  Until recently, almost all judges and bar associations have 
ignored those recommendations.125  There are, however, some signs of 
change.  The ready access to online documents has fed desires for self-
representation and low-cost assistance in routine matters.  Indeed, the 
present legal market is ripe for the efforts of disruptive innovators 
stimulating total market transformation.126  From a regulatory perspective, 
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the key focus should not be blocking these innovations from the market, but 
rather using regulation to ensure that the public’s interests are met.  Some 
jurisdictions are moving in this direction.  For example, New York and 
California are considering licensing structures, and Washington has 
implemented one for certain specialties.127 
But the profession’s responsibility to the public requires more than ad 
hoc reaction to change.  Rather, the bar should be explicit about its 
regulatory objectives.128  Those objectives should include not only 
protecting consumers against unethical and unqualified providers, but also 
facilitating consumer choice and enhancing access to justice.  From that 
perspective, regulation, not prohibition, of lay specialists makes sense.  In 
creating a licensing structure for nonlawyers, decisionmakers should 
consider the procedural and substantive complexity of the services 
provided, the urgency of unmet needs, and the likelihood of confusion over 
the lawyer’s role.129 
The need for such a regulatory system is particularly apparent in the area 
of immigration, a field characterized by both pervasive fraud and unmet 
needs.130  Individuals holding themselves out as notaries and immigration 
consultants have preyed on the ignorance of undocumented consumers who 
cannot afford attorneys.  Many of these consultants capitalize on the status 
of notario publicos in some Latin American countries, where these legal 
professionals enjoy formal legal training and authority to provide legal 
assistance.131  Undocumented residents who are victims of “notario fraud” 
are often unwilling to approach authorities to complain.  The situation 
would benefit from a licensing structure similar to that in Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, which allows for licensed nonlawyer experts to 
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provide immigration-related assistance.132  Although the United States 
allows accredited nonlawyers to represent individuals in immigration 
appeals, it permits only representatives who work for nonprofit 
organizations and who accept only nominal fees for their efforts.133  An 
expanded accreditation and oversight system to allow qualified lay experts 
to charge reasonable fees would go a long way towards expanding access to 
justice for a population in great need of assistance.134  Given the possibility 
for confusion over the lawyer’s role, and the complexity of some of the 
issues involved, such a system would require adequate training 
requirements and expanded enforcement resources.  Similar regulatory 
systems should be developed in other contexts to allow nonlawyer 
provision of routine services.135  Various consumer protections should be 
required concerning qualifications, training, disclaimers, malpractice 
liability and insurance, discipline, and so forth.136  Many administrative 
agencies already have power to regulate nonlawyers appearing before them, 
and no evidence suggests that these frameworks have been inadequate or 
that agencies have more disciplinary problems with nonlawyers than 
lawyers.137  Under their inherent powers, courts could oversee the 
development of such systems or could approve them as consistent with the 
public interest.  As we noted earlier, a number of courts have already taken 
such approaches in evaluating unauthorized-practice claims.138  So, for 
example, after considering factors such as cost, availability of services, and 
consumer convenience, the Washington Supreme Court held that it was in 
the public interest for licensed real estate brokers to fill in standard form 
agreements.139  New York is assessing limited licensing in substantive areas 
where there is a great gap in access to justice, such as housing and 
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consumer credit.140  Such consumer-oriented approaches would make for a 
more socially defensible regulatory structure than the conventional ban on 
nonlawyer practice, irrespective of its quality and cost-effectiveness. 
A more consumer-oriented approach would also vest enforcement 
authority in a more disinterested body than the organized bar.  Where to 
locate enforcement responsibility will vary by jurisdiction.  What is 
important is to centralize authority and to ensure that the entity in charge 
has sufficient resources, remedial power, and accountability to respond 
effectively to cases of consumer injury. 
Over a quarter century ago, an ABA Commission on Professionalism 
report concluded, “It can no longer be claimed that lawyers have the 
exclusive possession of the esoteric knowledge required and are therefore 
the only ones able to advise clients on any matter concerning the law.”141  It 
is time for the bar to act on that assertion and reform unauthorized-practice 
law and enforcement accordingly. 
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